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We investigate the drivers of credit union penetration with data from 90 countries
for the period 2005–2017. Generally, the results show that the number of credit
unions, the level of financial development of a country, the level of industrialization
of a country, and the institutional environment are significantly supportive of credit
union penetration. We conclude that the elimination of restrictions on the formation
of credit unions (if any), the adoption of industrialization as development path, the
implementation of sound monetary and fiscal policies that promote financial develop-
ment, and the pursuit of good public governance are crucial for credit union
penetration.
1 | INTRODUCTION
Credit unions1 are not-for-profit microfinance institutions (MFIs)
owned and controlled by their members established to promote sav-
ings and offer credit to “members at a fair and reasonable interest
rate” (Henock, 2019). The primary function of credit unions is the
delivery of individual financial loans based on collective savings
(Da Silva, Leite, Guse, & Gollo, 2017). The absence of credit unions
will result in many people having no access to consumer credit ser-
vices, mortgage loans, agricultural credit, and mortgages (McKee,
Kagan, & Ghosh, 2019).
The importance of credit unions to the socio-economic develop-
ment of society is articulated in terms of their promotion of private
resources to create savings and as well as their financing of entrepre-
neurial initiatives culminating in job creation (Guerra Junior &
Silva, 2013). According to World Bank (2007), financial cooperatives
fill a significant gap in the market with a sustainable institutional and
business model based on a member-owned service organization serv-
ing an unserved but bankable clientele with products driven by
demand and with sound financial management founded on members'
resources and a “savings first” approach to credit discipline. Vilela,
Nagano, and Merlo (2007) argue that credit unions allow sections of
society to organize the pursuit of solutions to problems of access to
credit and banking services, autonomously and independently.
The owner–borrower feature of credit unions in which deposi-
tors/owners are usually borrowers suggests that their ability to mobi-
lize more members carries some critical implications for their
sustainability. The performance of credit unions in a given country in
terms of mobilizing members is called credit union penetration. To
effectively utilize credit unions as tools for promoting financial inclu-
sion and alleviating poverty, policymakers must know the factors that
drive their penetration. Despite the policy relevance of these factors,
the credit union literature (e.g., Amoah, Aboagye, Bokpin, & Ohene-
Asare, 2018; Henock, 2019; McKillop & Quinn, 2017; Unda &
Ranasinghe, 2019) is yet to delineate them. This study attempts to fill
this void. Do credit unions penetrate more when the development
path of a country is industrialization? Do robust institutions support
or slow down credit union penetration? These are some of the ques-
tions the study seeks empirical answers to. In doing this, we construct
panel data from the annual statistical reports compiled by the World
Council of Credit Unions (WOCCU) covering 2005 to 2017.
Three reasons justify this study. First, the findings of this study
should broaden the horizon of the extant literature on the social per-
formance of credit unions. Second, an insight into the impact of coun-
try context on credit union penetration, for example, has the potential
to guide investment funds interested in channeling their loanable
funds through credit unions for the dual purpose of earning some
decent returns and achieving social impact. Third, answering the ques-
tion of the drivers of credit union penetration has an inherent effect
of highlighting the possible connection between credit unions and the
idiosyncratic features of the study countries.
The various estimations using static and dynamic estimators have
yielded the following outcomes. The number of credit unions; the
level of financial development; industrialization; and political stability;
the rule of law; and the regulatory quality variables have emerged as
factors that improve credit union penetration in the study countries.
The implication is that holding other factors constant, an improvement
in any of these variables is likely to drive credit union penetration
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positively. On the other hand, the rural population, gender inequality,
and human development have come up as slowing down credit union
penetration. It follows that holding other factors constant, an increase
in any of these variables should undermine the capacity of credit
unions to sign on the more economically productive population of the
study countries. Because we are not aware of any empirical investiga-
tion into the drivers of credit union penetration using country-level
data, these results represent the contribution of this study to
knowledge.
The rest of the paper follows this order. Section 2 focuses on the
background and empirical review. Section 3 explains the methods
adopted for the study. Section 4 discusses the results. Section 5
focuses on the conclusion of the paper.
2 | BACKGROUND AND EMPIRICAL
REVIEW
2.1 | Background
MFIs are known as channels for promoting financial inclusion among
the poor and financially excluded. Their lending methodologies,
including group lending, allow them to reach out to those at the low-
est end of the economic spectrum who, for reasons such as non-
viability, lack of collateral, and absence of credible credit histories, are
avoided by the traditional banking system. They promote micro-
entrepreneurship through the development and delivery of tailor-
made microloans to poor entrepreneurs and households who access
such loans mostly on favorable terms to engage in productive eco-
nomic activities. Apart from microloans, MFIs also provide services
such as remittances, microinsurance, and electronic banking
(Tchakoute Tchuigoua, 2016). Pioneered by Muhamad Yunus in
Bangladesh, MFIs have, over the years, grown exponentially to repre-
sent a crucial layer in the financial architecture of most developing
economies. Indeed, the conferment of the Nobel Peace Award on
Muhamad Yunus in 2006 could mean the recognition by international
organizations of the monumental role of microfinance in the develop-
ment of financial markets in developing economies.
Differences exist among MFIs. They differ in terms of their legal
status and commercial orientation. Concerning legal status, the litera-
ture identifies microbanks, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),
cooperatives/credit unions, and nonbank financial institutions
(Liñares-Zegarra & Wilson, 2018). In terms of commercial orientation,
there are for-profit and not-for-profit MFIs. With financial inclusion
and poverty reduction as their social mission, the not-for-profit MFIs
focus on delivering credit and other financial services to the poorest
in the economic spectrum in such a way as to enable them to cover
their operating costs. In contrast, the for-profit MFIs offer financial
services to clients who cut across the entire income distribution. Due
to their commercial orientation, they are usually reluctant to serve the
more deprived communities.
Among the not-for-profit MFIs are credit unions. They are finan-
cial cooperatives organized to satisfy the needs of their members.
They distribute surplus or profits to their clients in the form of divi-
dends, reinvestment in the unions, and lower interest rates on loans.
They are governed by unpaid volunteer officers and directors who are
elected from the membership of the unions and charged with the
responsibility of determining the policies under which the
unions should operate. They operate on the cooperative principle:
one-man-one-vote irrespective of savings or loan balance (Mckillop &
Wilson, 2011). They are tax exempt in many countries due to the role
they play (Mckillop & Wilson, 2015). Theoretically, credit unions are
defined by a common bond.2 The common bond might restrict
membership to a local community, employees of a particular firm, or
individuals with some other organizational affiliation. The original
purpose of the common bond is to enable members to substitute
collateral with their knowledge of each other's creditworthiness.
Credit unions perform a crucial role, even in advanced countries.
Mckillop and Wilson (2015) identify four ways in which credit
unions differ from banks. First, they serve their members character-
ized by a common bond (i.e., the social glue that binds members
together). Second, they serve members who are deemed too risky by
mainstream financial institutions. Third, they are tax exempt in many
countries because of their role in providing financial services to those
of modest means. Fourth, they are not required to simultaneously sat-
isfy shareholders' profit expectations and disparate customer needs
(Mckillop & Wilson, 2015).
2.2 | Empirical review
Previous research on credit unions/financial cooperatives has looked
at diverse issues except for the factors that drive credit union pene-
tration. Goddard, Mackillop, and Wilson (2008) examine the impact of
revenue diversification on the financial performance of US credit
unions for the period 1993–2004. They observe that on both risk-
adjusted and unadjusted returns measures, a positive direct exposure
effect is outweighed by a negative indirect exposure effect for all but
the largest credit unions. Mathuva (2016) assess the impact of reve-
nue diversification on the financial performance of 212 deposit-taking
savings and credit cooperatives (SACCOs) in Kenya over the period
2008–2013. The study demonstrates that increased dependence on
noninterest income is associated with higher returns. It shows that
SACCOs with more diversified revenues record volatile returns.
SACCOs with less concentrated revenue streams are characterized by
higher volatility in returns. Da Silva et al. (2017) analyze the financial
and economic performance of credit unions of major Brazilian credit
cooperatives and observe that Uniprime Northern Paraná, Sicoob
Cocred, and Sicredi North RS/SC as outstanding cooperatives in terms
of efficiency.
McKillop and Quinn (2017) examine the business model complex-
ity of Irish credit unions using a latent class approach to measure
structural performance over the period 2002 to 2013. The study finds
a three-class system to be appropriate with the multiclass model
dependent on three financial viability characteristics. The study also
observes relative performance differences for each class in terms of
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technical efficiency and that two of the classes are subject to disecon-
omies of scale.
Hessou (2017) deploys data from 100 largest credit unions in
Canada covering 1996 to 2014 to analyze the importance of the Basel
III additional capital buffer requirements for credit union prudential
regulation. The study observes that Canadian credit union capital
buffers behave counter-cyclically over the business cycle. Further,
credit unions keep a capital buffer bigger than the maximum buffer
required under Basel III, which is 5% of risk-weighted assets.
Liñares-Zegarra and Wilson (2018) investigate the relationship
between size and growth. The study relies on a sample of MFIs with
different ownership forms (microbanks, NGOs, cooperatives/credit
unions, and nonbank financial institutions) and commercial orientation
(profit and not-for-profit) collected from 120 countries over the
period 2000 to 2014. The study finds little evidence that size offers
growth advantages to MFIs.
Amoah et al. (2018) interrogate the discretional and non-
discretional factors that impact loans credit unions lend to their mem-
bers and find that size, profitability, management quality, and
solvency positively associated with credit union loan business. The
study shows that loan loss, net worth, nonloan income, and nonloan
activities are negatively associated with credit union loan business.
The study further demonstrates that contractionary monetary policy
increases the demand for credit union loan.
Unda and Ranasinghe (2019) assess the impact of board of direc-
tors' pay on insolvency risk in Australian credit unions and find, among
other things, that both voluntary boards and highly paid boards are
more likely to reduce insolvency risk. However, depending on the size
of the credit union, the effect of board remuneration has two distinct
effects on insolvency risk. Whereas volunteer boards are linked with
less probability of insolvency risk in smaller credit unions, highly paid
boards are associated with less probability of insolvency risk in larger
credit unions.
We seek to add to the above literature by identifying the factors
that account for credit union penetration. Many country context fac-
tors could influence credit union penetration. One of them is eco-
nomic growth that may create a higher demand for goods and
services as well as open up opportunities for expansion of micro-
enterprises (Hermes & Hudon, 2018). It may correlate with growth in
demand for microcredit. A growing economy may increase the current
and expected incomes of households, which may fuel their desire for
entrepreneurship. Thus, economic growth may lead to more credit
union penetration.
On the other hand, credit unions are also likely to flourish in a
weak economy. Slack in the growth of an economy may result in
demand substitution where imports or higher quality goods are
substituted with goods produced by microenterprises (Ahlin, Lin, &
Maio, 2011). Furthermore, credit unions are likely to attract more
members during economic recession or crisis because the demand for
the services of credit unions may increase as poor households lose
their jobs in the formal economy and have to turn to the activities in
the informal sector for survival. Most clients of MFIs access
microcredit for microentrepreneurship (Mahmood, 2011). Therefore,
an improvement in an economy that usually comes with some rise in
wage-earning opportunities may drive away existing and potential cli-
ents of credit unions as well as worsen nonperforming loans in such
institutions. It may be due to the tendency of existing clients to
renounce their interest in their relationships with the institutions.
Credit unions may not be able to penetrate a growing economy
because the demand for microfinance services may decrease as
households and entrepreneurs can fund projects from profits or can
source funds from traditional sources of finance such as banks. A
deteriorating economy may create less demand for savings and loan
services from credit unions because business opportunities become
scarce in such an economy. It is also possible for macroeconomic con-
ditions to have a neutral effect on credit union penetration. It may
occur where most of the clients of credit unions are in the informal
sector, and the sector is unrelated to the formal sector.
Does the level of a country's financial development accelerate or
slow down credit union penetration? The development of the domes-
tic financial system may slow down credit union penetration as cur-
rent and potential clients of credit unions may switch to formal
financial institutions such as commercial banks for reasons of lower
costs, more options, and more flexibility. Again, in a more developed
financial system, commercial banks may take to offering financial ser-
vices to the poor if they observe that MFIs are making some decent
returns from lending to the poor. It may cause credit unions to lose cli-
ents leading to a fall in their penetration rates. On the other hand,
credit unions are likely to mobilize more customers and achieve a bet-
ter financial performance in countries where financial markets are
weak (Cull, Demirguc-Kunt, & Morduch, 2013; Vanroose &
D'Espallier, 2013), as the poor and financially excluded may consider
MFIs as their only hope.
The institutional environment of credit unions may significantly
predict their ability to attract more members. The institutional envi-
ronment provides possibilities and constraints on entrepreneurship,
which may affect the membership of credit unions. Credit unions are
likely to flourish in the atmosphere of clear property rights, the strict
rule of law, and an effective government that formulates business-
friendly policies (Hermes & Hudon, 2018). On the other hand, a robust
institutional environment may impede microentrepreneurship leading
to less demand for the services of credit unions, hence, low penetra-
tion rate. For instance, an influential government may imply more
rules and regulations. These rules and regulations create higher costs
for small-scale entrepreneurs and, thus, decrease the demand for
financial services offered by credit unions. A growing corruption saps
the resources of microenterprises and blocks their expansion, slowing
down the demand for MFI services, which may undermine credit
union penetration. On the other hand, a growing corruption may facil-
itate the circumvention of existing regulations, pushing existing and
potential customers out of the formal sector into the informal sector,
which may lead to a higher demand for the services of credit unions.
Is the political system of a country a significant predictor of credit
union penetration? With strong political accountability, politicians are
more likely to pursue policies and programs that support entrepre-
neurship. It may increase demand for credit unions as indigent
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entrepreneurs may seek financial assistance from credit unions for
their entrepreneurial exploits. The lack of transparency in the political
system of a country may compel economic actors to show interest in
the informal sector, driving up demand for credit unions, other things
being equal. Political instability is unfriendly to entrepreneurship and,
thus, may decrease demand for credit unions. On the other hand,
political stability may promote economic activities in the informal sec-
tor, which may accelerate demand for credit unions.
Does the number of credit unions in a given country positively
correlate with the credit union penetration rate? The answer is not
straightforward because where country-context conditions do not
favor microfinance activities, a mere multiplication of credit unions
will not promote penetration. It presupposes that the effect of the
number of credit unions in a given country may be contingent on the
prevailing economic circumstances.
3 | DATA SOURCES AND VARIABLES
3.1 | Data
Data on credit union penetration and the number of credit unions in
each country are obtained from WOCCU at www.woccu.org.
WOCCU is the world apex body of credit unions. Among other things,
WOCCU advocates internationally to achieve better legislative and
regulatory outcomes for credit unions and other cooperative financial
institutions and their members. Also, it provides education and global
networking for the exchange of information and ideas (WOCCU,
2017). There are 89,026 credit unions in 117 countries from six conti-
nents, with 260,164,742 members (WOCCU, 2017).
Credit union penetration rate is modeled by the macroeconomic,
institutional, and aggregate number of credit unions in a given coun-
try. The study gathers data on per capita gross domestic product
(GDP) growth rate, labor force participation rate, rural population as a
share of the total population of a country, and credit to the private
sector as a share of GDP from the World Development Indicators.
The study also gathers the human development index, gender inequal-
ity index, and female to male unemployment ratio data from UNDP
(2018) at hdr.undp.org. Governance variables (political stability and
absence of violence/terrorism; regulatory quality; the rule of law,
voice, and accountability; control of corruption; and government
effectiveness) are obtained from Worldwide Governance Indicators
(WGI) (2018) at datalog.worldbank.org.
The study covers 2005 to 2017 fiscal years. Data availability has
dictated this period. The annual statistical reports compiled by
WOCCU, which aggregate the statistics of credit unions in countries,
cover 2005 to 2017. The sample for the study is built based on two
specific criteria. To be included in the sample, a country must first
have at least 5-year data on penetration rate out of the 13-year data
expected from each country (2005–2017). Second, the country must
have at least 4-year data on the explanatory variables in the model
adopted for the study. The application of these criteria yields a sample
of 90 countries with the following distribution: 22 African countries,
2 North American countries, 6 South Pacific countries, 14 Latin
American countries, 11 European countries, 15 Caribbean countries,
and 20 Asian countries. The distribution of the sample reflects its
geographical diversity.
3.2 | Variables
3.2.1 | Dependent variable
The study adopts WOCCU's definition of credit union penetration
rate: the total number of credit union members divided by the eco-
nomically active population age 15–64 years old. The higher this ratio,
the greater the penetration rate of credit unions in a country.
3.2.2 | Explanatory variables
Many explanatory variables are employed to model credit union pene-
tration. The number of credit unions in a country should influence
credit union penetration positively. Thus, the natural logarithm of the
number of credit unions is included in the model. Per capita GDP
growth rate is used to gauge the state of economic progress of each
country. As explained above, a priori its effect on credit union pene-
tration is unclear.
The inclusion of workforce participation rate in the model is
important because it measures the prevalence of labor opportunities
in a given country, which may support or rival the ability of credit
unions to attract members. It is measured by dividing the labor force
in a country by the population aged 15 or above.
Poverty is usually higher in rural areas, especially in developing
countries. It explains why many microfinance activities are
rural-centered, where it is estimated that about 75% of indigent peo-
ple in developing countries dwell, surviving directly or indirectly on
agriculture (Dorfleitner, Just-Marx, & Priberny, 2017). Therefore,
credit unions are likely to flourish in a country that has a higher pro-
portion of its population living in rural areas. Percent of the population
in rural areas is, thus, one of the variables in this study. Its effect on
penetration is expected to be positive.
We measure the degree of financial development of a country by
the credit to the private sector as a share of GDP. Its effect on pene-
tration could be negative or positive. However, in this study, we
expect the effect to be positive.
We take into account the extent of human development of a
country in which credit unions operate by capturing the human devel-
opment index obtained from the United Nations Development Pro-
gram (UNDP) in the model. The index measures the standard of living,
life expectancy, and education. A higher value suggests higher produc-
tivity of labor, which may have positive or negative consequences for
the ability of credit unions to mobilize more members. That notwith-
standing, we predict that it should have a negative impact on credit
union penetration. Another variable that is also obtained from the
UNDP is the gender inequality index. It is a composite index using
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three dimensions: reproductive health, empowerment, and the labor
market. A high index indicates high inequality between women and
men and vice versa. To the extent that MFIs target women who are
most disadvantaged (Strøm, D'Espallier, & Mersland, 2014), a rising
inequality between women and men should support credit union pen-
etration and vice versa. The same argument is advanced for the effect
of unemployment on credit union penetration. As the unemployment
ratio between females and males rises in a given country, this is likely
to support credit union penetration, holding other factors constant.
All things being equal, when industrialization is the development
path of a country, income-earning jobs are created that improve stan-
dard of living. As people's standard of living improves, they are more
likely to prefer transacting business with the mainstream financial
institutions than credit unions, holding other factors. We, therefore,
expect industrialization to slow down credit union penetration.
Finally, we capture the institutional environment in the model by
adding the six WGI: political stability and lack of violence; control of
corruption; the rule of law; regulatory quality; government effective-
ness; and voice and accountability. A higher value of any of these six
variables suggests a better institutional outcome and vice versa. Due
to the high correlation among them, they will enter the model one
after the other. It requires estimating the estimation of six versions of
the model developed for this study. Table 1 summarizes the variables
and their expected effects on credit union penetration.
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables. The
table reveals that the mean, minimum, and maximum values of credit
penetration rate is 19.49, 0.03, and 4193, respectively. These statis-
tics inform us that on average, credit unions in the sample have
recorded about 19.49% penetration rates with 128.122% deviation
from the mean value. Outliers are observed in the sample. One of
such is the financial development variable. Hence, to correct outliers
and establish an elasticity relationship, we use the natural logarithms
of variables with nonnegative values.
The correlations among the variables are checked by the Pearson
correlation matrix in Table 3. The correlations between pairs of
explanatory variables are well within acceptable range except those
between pairs of WGI. The high correlations between pairs of WGI
require that the six indicators should not enter the model at a time;
otherwise, the results will be unreliable due to multicollinearity
problem.
3.3 | The model and analytical techniques
Based on the outcome of the Hausman (1978) test specification, the
fixed effects model is chosen over pooled ordinary least squares and
random effects models to identify the predictors of credit union pene-
tration. The model is as folllows:
Yit = α+ β1Xi,t + dt+ uit …………… ð1Þ
where Yit = credit union penetration that is the predicted variable;
X = a set of explanatory variables; α = constant; dt = time dummies;
μ = error term; i and t = country and time effects, respectively.
Equation 1 is augmented with the inclusion of lagged dependent
variable as a regressor, and a dynamic version of the above model is
TABLE 1 Variables description, priors, and sources
Variable Notation Definition Expected sign Source
Credit union penetration PEN Total number of credit union members divided by the
economically active population age 15–64 years old
N/A WOCCU
Credit unions C.U. The natural logarithm of the number of credit unions in a
country
− -do-
Economic growth Growth Per capita GDP growth rate − WDI
Workforce participation WFP Labor force in a country by the population aged 15 or above + -do-
Rural population RURAL Percent of the population in rural areas − -do-
Financial development FINDEV Credit to the private sector as a share of GDP + -do-
Human development H.D. Human development index − UNDP
Gender inequality GII Gender inequality index + -do-
Unemployment UNEMP Female to male unemployment ratio + -do-
Industrialization INDUS Manufacturing (value added) as a share of GDP − -do-
Political stability and lack of violence PSTAB Political stability and lack of violence index (−2.5 to 2.5) + WGI
Control of corruption index CORRUP Control of corruption index (−2.5 to 2.5) + -do-
Rule of law index ROL Rule of law index (−2.5 to 2.5) + -do-
Regulatory quality RQUAL Regulatory quality index (−2.5 to 2.5) + -do-
Government effectiveness GEFF Government effectiveness index (−2.5 to 2.5) + -do-
Voice and accountability VACC Voice and accountability index (−2.5 to 2.5) + -do-
Abbreviations: WGI, World Governance Indicators; WDI, World Development Indicators; WOCCU, World Council of Credit Unions.
Source: Authors' compilations.
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estimated by the two-step difference generalized method of moments
(GMM) estimation technique (Arellano & Bond, 1991; Arellano &
Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998). The GMM approach is an
advanced 2SLS-IV procedure (Roodman, 2009, 2014). The conven-
tional IV estimator is also inefficient in the presence of hetero-
skedasticity. Arellano and Bond (1991) developed the difference
GMM. Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998)
developed the system GMM. GMM is known to correct simultaneity
and endogeneity problems associated with panel regressions. The
appeal of GMM techniques is attributed to the following: they control
for unobserved firm-specific effects; they first-difference non-
stationary variables; they overcome the endogeneity of the explana-
tory variables by using instruments; and they test for the presence of
autocorrelation (Saci, Giorgioni, & Holden, 2009). The basic differ-
ences between the system and difference GMM approaches are that
the system GMM estimator involves a set of additional restrictions
(more instruments) on the initial conditions of the process generating
the dependent variable (Roodman, 2009). Either the system or differ-
ence GMM is a valid dynamic panel data technique. However, we find
the two-step difference GMM approach a sufficient method that sat-
isfies the objectives of the study. The use of two-step difference
GMM is consistent with Adeleye, Adedoyin, and Nathaniel (2020);
Abrate, Piacenza, and Vannoni (2009); Waziri, Mohamed Nor, Raja
Abdullah, and Adamu (2015); Chen and Kao (2014); Aali-Bujari,
Venegas-Martínez, and Pérez-Lechuga (2016); Siddiqui and
Ahmed (2013); and Gnangoin, Du, Assamoi, Edjoukou, and
Kassi (2019).
4 | REGRESSION RESULTS AND
DISCUSSIONS
4.1 | Baseline results
Due to the high correlations among the WGI variables, a nested
regression approach is adopted in which the governance indicators
enter the model one after the other. Approximately, across the six
regression specifications, the explanatory power of the independent
variables in explaining the variations in credit union penetration is
34%. Consistently, a 1% change in the number of credit unions is
associated with about 21% increase in credit union penetration,
ceteris paribus. It occurs at a 1% significance level. Thus, our predic-
tion of a positive relationship between the number of credit unions
and credit union penetration is supported. It is understandable
because as the number of credit unions springs up in a country, this
enhances the chances of attracting more members.
An improvement in the domestic financial system of a country
supports the development of credit unions. A 1% change in financial
development causes a 20% increase in credit union penetration rate,
holding other factors constant. It may be due to the opportunity for
credit unions to learn best practices from the traditional financial insti-
tutions in developed financial systems, which makes them attractive
alternatives to traditional financial institutions. This observation runs
counter to Cull et al. (2013) and Vanroose and D'Espallier (2013) who
posit that credit unions mobilize more customers and achieve a better
financial performance in countries where financial markets are weak.
TABLE 2 Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs M SD Min Max
PEN 1099 19.485 128.122 0.03 4193
CUs 1112 632.367 1676.378 1 20,193
FINDEV 1059 52.141 42.682 3.121 233.211
RURAL 1105 49.91 21.751 4.76 87.022
GROWTH 1153 2.689 3.924 −18.491 32.997
WFP 743 63.448 8.364 37.6 91.6
GII 700 0.422 0.16 0.063 0.742
UNEMP 738 1.3 0.498 0.47 3.25
INDUS 1109 11.85 6.315 0.755 34.566
HDI 1118 0.668 0.151 0.283 0.939
PSTAB 1170 −0.126 0.848 −2.781 1.593
CORRUP 1170 −0.123 0.955 −1.673 2.391
ROL 1170 −0.165 0.898 −1.897 2.009
RQUAL 1170 −0.06 0.926 −2.53 2.261
GEFF 1170 −0.105 0.896 −2.085 2.437
VACC 1166 −0.008 0.85 −2.313 1.629
Abbreviations: CORRUP, control of corruption; CUs, Number of credit unions; FINDEV, financial development; GEFF, government effectiveness; GII, the
gender inequality between females and males; GROWTH, economic growth; HDI, human development index; INDUS, industrialization; PEN, penetration
rate of credit unions; PSTAB, political stability; ROL, rule of law; RURAL, rural population; UNEMP, the unemployment ratio between females and males;
VACC, voice and accountability; WFP, workforce participation.
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It means our expectation of a positive relationship between financial
development and credit union penetration is upheld.
Typically, the income levels of the population in rural areas are
low due to low and less productive economic activities in such areas.
Furthermore, because MFIs, including credit unions, usually target
the poor and financially excluded, it is reasonable to expect some
positive relationship between credit union penetration and the per-
cent of the rural population. Surprisingly, the results in Table 4 sug-
gest some rivalry between credit union penetration and rural
population. Across the six regressions, a percentage increase in rural
population results in about a 4% drop in credit union penetration
rate. This runs counter to the prediction of a positive relationship
between rural population and credit union penetration. The modus
operandi of credit unions, which requires some basic level of income
to qualify for membership, may explain this outcome. Unlike NGOs,
membership of a credit union requires some income for registration
and deposit. MFIs serve low-income persons as well as small and
informal businesses in developing and newly industrialized countries
(Tchakoute Tchuigoua, 2016). In most cases, poverty is severe in the
rural areas of these countries. The lack of income for registration and
deposit may drive potential clients of credit unions to other forms of
MFIs such as NGOs.
Industrialization proxied by manufacturing (value-added) as a
share of GDP comes up as complementing credit union penetration.
The results in Table 4 reveal that between 34% and 39% variations in
credit union penetration are accounted for by industrialization. A per-
centage increase in industrialization triggers between 34% and 39%
change in credit union penetration rate holds other factors constant.
It can be attributed to the cooperative principles of credit union that
require some savings before becoming a member of a credit union.
Industrialization offers opportunities for job creation. Access to job
opportunities improves income levels that support credit union pene-
tration. The implication is that our expectation that it should slow
credit union penetration is unsupported.
MFIs target women (Strøm et al., 2014) who are most disadvan-
taged. According to Strøm et al. (2014), women quickly access leader-
ship positions in the often more mission-driven NGOs and
cooperatives. Thus, other things being equal, a rising inequality
between women and men should support credit union penetration.
However, it appears that credit unions are not likely to mobilize more
members in a rising inequality between women and men. This is
because, in Table 4, gender inequality between women and men
exhibits a negative and statistically significant effect on credit union
penetration. It occurs at the 10% significance level. It means that our
expectation of a positive relationship is not met.
Table 4 shows that three of the WGI capturing the institutional
environment of the countries in this study (political stability and
absence of violence; the rule of law; and regulatory quality) come up
as complementing credit union penetration. A unit change in political
stability and absence of violence score of a country cause about 30%
(p < .0000) increase in credit union penetration. Political stability pro-
motes economic activities in the informal sector leading to an increase
in the demand for credit unions. The rule of law supports credit union
penetration. It captures “perceptions of the extent to which agents
have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular
the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and
the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.” A unit
change in the rule of law index of a country is likely to cause about a
48% increase in the credit union penetration rate of the country, hold-
ing other factors constant. Entrepreneurship thrives in an environ-
ment where citizens perceive that existing laws, primarily, those
relating to property rights, are rigorously enforced. It creates demand
for the services of credit unions resulting in high credit union penetra-
tion. A similar argument is made for the positive and statistically sig-
nificant relationship (p < .0000) between regulatory quality and credit
union penetration. Holding other factors constant, a percentage
increase in the regulatory quality of index of a country results in about
47% increase in penetration. Regulatory quality measures perceptions
of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound
policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector devel-
opment. Entrepreneurship, especially microentrepreneurship, flour-
ishes in a country whose government can formulate and implement
sound policies and regulations that support private sector develop-
ment. When this occurs, demand for financial services, including the
services offered by credit unions, rises, leading to an increase in credit
union penetration. The implication of the prediction that these three
governance variables should drive credit union penetration positively
is supported.
Contrary to our prediction, three governance variables (control of
corruption, government effectiveness and voice, and accountability)
show no significant impact on credit union penetration. Similarly,
across the six columns in Table 4, GDP growth rate, unemployment
ratio, and work participation exhibit no significant effects on credit
union penetration.
4.2 | Robustness checks
The per capita GDP growth rate is substituted with per capita GDP ($)
to check the robustness of the results in Table 4. Besides, foreign
direct investment is introduced as an additional explanatory variable.
A country's development path may be based on foreign direct invest-
ment flowing into the country. More inflows from foreign economies
into a domestic economy may improve economic activity that can lead
to demand for more financial services in both formal and informal sec-
tors. It may lead to an improvement in credit union penetration. On
the other hand, an improvement in an economy occasioned by foreign
direct investment may siphon customers away from the informal sec-
tor to the formal sector that may affect the ability of credit unions to
get more members.
Table 5 presents the results of the new estimations. As can be
observed, the effects of the significant variables identified in Table 4
have not changed. GDP per capita does not exhibit any significant
relationship with credit union penetration under all the estimations.
Under the six estimations, foreign direct investment shows up as
supporting credit union penetration. Approximately, a 1% rise in
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foreign direct investment results in about a 7% rise in credit union
penetration, holding other factors constant.
The robustness of the results is also checked by transforming the
baseline model into a dynamic one and estimating it with two-step
robust difference GMM.3 Two-step difference GMM is efficient and
robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (Roodman, 2009). In
estimating the difference GMM, the insignificant variables reported in
Table 4 enter as instruments. The model is augmented by education
index obtained from UNDP as an additional variable. It is assumed to
be an internal variable. Table 6 shows the results of the GMM estima-
tions. The diagnostics reported below the table establish the validity
of the results. The Hansen statistic is insignificant at the 5% level.
Hence, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of over-identifying restric-
tions in the model.
The positive coefficients of the number of credit unions, politi-
cal stability, the rule of law, and regulatory quality have not changed
except that the coefficient of regulatory quality is now statistically
insignificant. Government effectiveness has now emerged as a sig-
nificant predictor of credit union penetration rate. The coefficients
of industrialization, gender inequality, human development, rural
population, and financial development have also not changed. How-
ever, the coefficients of industrialization, rural population financial
development are now statistically insignificant, save the results in
column 6, which reveal industrialization as supporting credit union
penetration.
4.3 | Other robustness checks
Using the year 2009 as the terminal point of the global financial crisis,
we split the dataset into two: 2005–2009 and 2010–2017 and ran
new regressions. We did not observe any significant results that dif-
fered from the baseline results. They are not reported but are avail-
able upon a reasonable request. Besides, we followed the example of
Matemilola, Bany-Ariffin, Azman-Saini, and Annuar (2019) to reduce
the six governance indicators into one index by finding the average
index. We then used it to perform a new set of regressions. No results
different from the baseline results were observed. They are not
reported but are available if requested.
5 | CONCLUSION
This paper addresses the question of significant predictors of credit
union penetration using data from 90 countries drawn from across
the globe. Dictated by data availability, the study covers 2005 to
2017. Guided by the Hausman (1978) test for panel regression speci-
fication, the study has deployed fixed effects regression technique to
identify the significant predictors of credit union penetration. Gener-
ally, the baseline results reveal the number of credit unions, the level
of financial development, industrialization, political stability, the rule
of law, and regulatory quality as significantly supportive of credit
union penetration. It suggests that an improvement in any of these
variables could accelerate the membership drive of credit unions in
the study countries. These results support the conclusion that the
elimination of restrictions on the formation of credit unions (if any),
the adoption of industrialization as development path, the implemen-
tation of sound monetary and fiscal policies that promote financial
development, and the pursuit of good public governance are crucial
for credit union penetration. On the other hand, the results show that
rural population, gender inequality, and human development slow
down credit union penetration. In our view, these impeding factors
must be addressed alongside the favorable ones to accelerate credit
union penetration in the study countries.
We highlight two policy recommendations of our findings. First,
to the extent the number of credit unions in a given supports credit
union penetration, the removal of any restrictions on the formation
of credit unions is likely to improve penetration. However, care
should be taken. Experience has shown that poor management of
mushroom credit unions that spring up due to less stringent regula-
tion usually creates problems for financial systems. This is because
when such credit unions eventually collapse, agitations by their
aggrieved members usually attenuate consumer confidence in the
entire financial system. Second, it is known from economic theory
that industrialization is key to economic development, especially in
developing economies where poverty is pervasive. The literature
documents that MFIs are more visible in developing economies as
tools for promoting financial inclusion and alleviating abject poverty.
Therefore, the finding that industrialization drives credit union pene-
tration allows us to contribute to the call for developing economies
to embrace industrialization as a path for economic development.
However, industrialization cannot be successful without some ingre-
dients. An improvement in the political climate, implementation of
effective and efficient regulatory regimes, and upholding the rule of
law are some of the vital support systems required for any effective
industrialization drive. Policymakers are, thus, advised to pay careful
attention to these factors.
It is important to point out one low point of this study. The
findings of this study may not be representative of all credit unions
in the world in the sense that it is not every credit union that is
affiliated to WOCCU. There may be some credit unions that have
not reported their data to WOCCU for which reason they are not
captured in this study. Notwithstanding this shortcoming, this paper
should open the floodgates for more investigations into the social
and financial performance of credit unions. Because MFIs differ in
many respects, it will be interesting if future research addresses the
issues raised in this paper with data from other MFIs. What are the
drivers of NGOs penetration? Where do nonbank financial institu-
tions penetrate? These are some of the questions that could be
considered by future research.
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ENDNOTES
1 They are also called financial cooperatives.
2 Gradually, this has become less relevant in some countries.
3 The GMM analysis are carried using Roodman (2009, 2014) xtabond2
user-written syntax in Stata. The syntax allows that all the right-hand
variables generally appears twice in the command first as regressors and
secondly as instruments. They are explicitly specified in the iv() that indi-
cates that they are instrumenting themselves.
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